effective in the more meaningful sense of benefiting the consumers who actually paid overcharges, either by providing compensation or more effective deterrence. Before the present study, I have examined this issue in two contexts, and have discovered that the states that repealed Illinois Brick have not managed to repeal the difficulties that the Supreme Court predicted would plague indirect purchaser cases. Those difficulties remain persistent obstacles to compensation of consumers and to effective antitrust enforcement.
First, I have studied class certification decisions in those states that authorize indirect purchaser suits, focusing whether class issues "predominate" over individual issues, as required by class action rules. In an article published in 1999,191 reported striking differences in approach to the certification inquiry.
2°S
ome courts freely certified indirect purchaser suits as class actions with minimal scrutiny of the evidence on which the plaintiffs expected to prove classwide impact. I characterized the approach of these courts, which I traced to the dissent in Illinois Brick, as the "sanguine view" of the problems of proving passing on. 21 Other courts, however, have scrutinized the proposed theories of classwide proof, and have identified a multitude of impediments to providing relief to the consumers who actually paid an overcharge. I characterized this approach as the "skeptical view." 22 Obviously, the states with the most skeptical view of these issues have not repealed Illinois Brick at all. But even in some states that have repealed Illinois Brick, courts take seriously the difficulties the Supreme Court identified in that case, and insist that representatives of the plaintiff class account for them in their proposals for certification. In most instances, the courts taking the skeptical view have denied class certification.
The sanguine and skeptical views amount to different standards of certification, even if the courts do not acknowledge them as such. There is a well-recognized tension in law governing certification.
2 3 On the one hand, Eisen laid down the principle that courts should not "conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of the suit in order to determine if it may be maintained as a class action." 24 On the other hand, Falcon requires that courts conduct a "rigorous analysis" of the requirements for certification to assure "actual, not (forthcoming 2005) . 21 Id., at 18-19. 22 Id., [17] [18] D. 366 (1996) . 24 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jaquelyn, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974) .
presumed" compliance. 25 Some courts have interpreted the Falcon standard to require consideration of the plaintiffs' evidence, not merely their allegations; and that inquiry can involve "entanglement with the merits." 2 6 As one of the certification cases I studied in 1999 stated the dilemma, the court must "walk the fine line between a rigorous analysis of the basic claims and methods of proof presented by the plaintiffs and the inappropriate delving into an assessment of the merits of those claims.", 27 The stakes in this balance are extraordinarily high. 2 8 Courts emphasize that denying certification of classes with small individual damages will likely mean denying relief. 2 9 They do sometimes recognize that granting certification will place great pressure on the defendant to settle for economic reasons, 30 although they mitigate this concern by holding out the (mostly theoretical) possibility of decertification at a later stage.
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Sanguine and skeptical courts balance these considerations in different ways. Sanguine courts suggest that "any doubts as to whether the class should be granted certification should be resolved in favor of certification. 32 More important, they examine proposed expert testimony only to determine if meets some minimal standard of validity, 33 in many cases requiring only that the expert propose a methodology that is "not so insubstantial as to amount to no method at all." 3 4 Moreover, they refuse to resolve a battle of experts, because to do so would implicate the merits. 35 Skeptical courts, by contrast, insist that the experts' methods "bridge the gap between theory and reality" 36 by 25 Gen. Telephone Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982) . Until 2003, the federal class action rule required that the certification decision be made "as soon as practicable"; that provision was amended in 2003 to read "at an early practicable time," in order to allow adequate discovery for the certification decision. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(a). 26 Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469, n. 12 (1978) . See also Earnest v. Amoco Oil Co., 859 So.2d 1255, 1258 (Fla. App. 2003) ("In conducting its 'rigorous analysis,' the trial court may look beyond the pleadings and, without resolving disputed issues, determine how disputed issues might be addressed on a classwide basis."). 27 Karofsky v. Abbott Labs., No. CV-95-1009 , slip op. at 6 (Me. Super. Ct. Cumberland Co. Oct. 15, 1997 . 28 Hazard, supra n 23, at 78 (observing that the certification decision has "potentially devastating consequences" for the losing side). 29 In re South Dakota Microsoft Antitrust Litig., 657 N.W.2d 668, 675 (S.D. 2003) . 30 Id.
Id.
32 Id. 33 See, e.g., Howe v. Microsoft Corp., 656 N.W.2d 285, 295-96 (N.D. 2003) ; S.D. Microsoft, 657 N.W.2d at 675. 34 In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 159 F.R. D. 682, 697 (D.Minn.1995) . See, e.g., Gordon v. Microsoft Corp., No. 00-5994, 2001 WL 366432, at 5 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Hennepin Co. Mar. 30, 2001 ) ; Bellinder v. Microsoft Corp., No. 00-C-0855, 00-C-00092, 99CV17089, 2001 WL 1397995, at 7 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Johnson Co. Sept. 7,2001 . Butcf. S.D. Microsoft, 657 N.W.2d at 673 (recognizing that "such a standard is little better than no standard," but nevertheless approving certification). 35 S. D. Microsoft, 657 N.W.2d at 678-79. Cf Caridad v. Metro North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 292 (2d Cir.1999 ) ("statistical dueling" between experts is not relevant to the certification issue). 36 A&M Supply Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 654 N.W.2d 572, 628 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002). testing, at least preliminarily, whether the evidence will permit proof of harm by classwide proof. One might fairly characterize this sort of inquiry as going to the merits. Skeptical courts sometimes justify their inquiry as a substantive requirement of their state's statute. 37 The issue of predominance requires courts to anticipate "what substantive issues will be important and how much of the litigation those issues will consume.
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To the extent courts examine evidence in support of those issues, they inquire into the merits. Predicting whether the plaintiffs' evidence will be able to establish harm by classwide proof involves an estimate of the likelihood of success on a substantive issue.
39
I argued in 1999 that whether a state applied one or the other standard was the single most important determinant of whether a class would be certified.
4°A
part from these standards of certification, however, I identified factual characteristics of classes that make proving passing on more difficult. 4 ' One characteristic is simply the availability of evidence. It counts against certification if the class consists of millions of consumers who purchased the product in frequent, undocumented transactions from a variety of sellers.
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Equally important are factors that complicate the task of calculating either the amount of the initial overcharge or the rate at which it was passed on to the class members. Proof is more complex, for example, if the initial overcharge varies over time; if firms at the intermediate levels of distribution have market power on the buying side or on the selling side (because variations in market power make buying prices and markup policies less consistent); if there is more than one intermediate level through which the overcharge is passed; or if the putative class members themselves could have passed on the overcharge to others. 43 Certification is also less likely if the monopolized product comes in many varieties, or if it is transformed or incorporated into other products in the chain of distribution. 4 4 I argued that these obstacles implied only a small subset of injured consumers will ever be members of an indirect purchaser class. The most difficult "ingredient" cases, for example, will never even be brought. Notice that these limitations do not mean there was no overcharge passed on to consumers; they only mean it would be impossible to prove it, at least by classwide proof. place the Microsoft indirect purchaser cases in the context of indirect purchaser litigation generally, analyzing how the rate of certification has been affected by the state in which the case was filed, the time when the case was filed, and the product that the case involved. That inquiry reveals that, while the high rate of certification may be partly attributable to the cases have been filed in "sanguine" states, or by a possible general trend in recent years toward greater leniency in certification, it also seems partly attributable to the specific character of the cases as Microsoft cases. Consequently, in Part III, I place the Microsoft indirect purchaser cases in the context of the much larger world of Microsoft litigation, pointing out that the government case does not support the claim of an overcharge. In Part IV, I examine the reasoning of the Microsoft certification cases in an effort to explain their unusually high rate of certification. I find that most of the difference appears to be attributable to the standard of certification, but I also identify characteristics of the case that courts identified as warranting certification. I separately consider one of these characteristics, the fact that these cases followed the government's victory in the To summarize the results at the outset, I found that indirect purchaser classes are being certified more frequently since my last study, but that most of that change is attributable to the Microsoft cases. Whether a Microsoft indirect purchaser class is certified appears to depend in large part on whether it is filed in a skeptical or sanguine jurisdiction. Most of the states certifying Microsoft classes never failed to certify an indirect purchaser class; Michigan, which denied certification, has never certified one. But some courts in previously skeptical jurisdictions also certified Microsoft classes. Table 1 shows that the high frequency of certification of the Microsoft cases does not simply reflect a general increase in frequency of certification of indirect purchaser cases since my last examination of the issue.
Courts have certified about half of all of the proposed classes to date, but the frequency has changed in recent years. Courts certified just over a third of the proposed classes before 1999, the period I considered in my last study. Since then, the courts have certified classes almost twice as frequently. But it turns out that the increase in frequency of certification is largely attributable to the Microsoft cases, 5° which account for more than half of more recent decisions and have been certified at a rate of almost 80%. It is true that half of the more recent non-Microsoft cases have been certified, an increase in frequency over the older set of cases, but far less than the rate in the Microsoft cases. This increase may be attributable to class counsel having learned from experience to file better cases in more favorable jurisdictions. Table 2 shows the frequency of certification of class actions involving the same product.
There have been far more certification decisions involving Microsoft software than any other product, and the vast majority of those classes have been certified. Classes involving other products have been certified at higher and lower rates. Although the samples are too small to draw any strong conclusions, they do suggest that there are characteristics of products and how they are distributed that may influence whether a class alleging an overcharge on the product will be certified. Table 3 shows the frequency with which each state has certified indirect purchaser classes, both generally and in Microsoft cases.
This Table shows Four states are less consistent in their application of certification standards. Of these, all but Maine granted certification in their Microsoft cases. Maine is thus of interest, because it is the only state to deny certification in a Microsoft case while granting certification in another case. Minnesota is also interesting, because it has only granted certification twice in ten decisions, both times in the same Microsoft case-one of those decisions was the initial grant of certification, 5 2 and one was the refusal to decertify the case after discovery, even though plaintiff's proposed methods for proof of classwide harm had changed. As we will see in Part IV, the court in that case took some pains to explain why the characteristics of the Microsoft case justified a different result from all of the other Minnesota certification cases.
In the forgoing tables, I have only considered cases, almost all in state courts, involving proposed classes that focused on a single state. In 2004, 52 The court actually issued two initial certification orders, one for indirect purchasers of operating systems, Gordon v. Microsoft Corp., No. 00-5994, 2001 WL 366432 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Hennepin Co. Mar. 30, 2001 , and one for indirect purchasers of applications. Gordon v. Microsoft Corp., NO. MC 00-5994, 2003 WL 23105552 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Hennepin Co. Mar. 14, 2003 . I have not treated the latter as a separate decision, even though it occurred 2 years later. Three other states certified applications classes in the same opinion as the OS classes; in each of these cases I treated the decision as a single certification. None of the states treated the issues for applications as materially different from the issues for operating systems. With the enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act, 59 more indirect purchaser classes will likely be heard in federal court because of that statute's relaxed requirements for diversity jurisdiction and for removal. On the evidence of these cases, it appears that those federal courts that treat certification as a federal issue will apply a relatively sanguine standard.
6°T
hose that look to state standards will presumably replicate the split between sanguine and skeptical states in their decisions. 
III. THE PLACE OF THE MICROSOFT INDIRECT PURCHASER CASES IN THE WORLD OF MICROSOFT ANTITRUST LITIGATION
The foregoing discussion leaves open the possibility that one reason for the higher rate of certification in the Microsoft cases may lie in the characteristics of the Microsoft antitrust litigation. Consequently, it may be helpful to describe briefly the relationship between the Microsoft indirect purchaser cases and the government litigation that preceded them. In 1999, Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson issued findings of fact accepting the government's contention that Microsoft had bundled its Internet Explorer browser with its dominant Windows operating system, and imposed other contractual and technological measures, all with the goal of limiting usage of Netscape's Navigator browser and Sun's Java programming language, and thus preventing them from evolving, together or separately, into a rival platform for applications software. 61 The following year, he held those actions unlawful under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 62 and ordered sweeping structural and injunctive relief. 63 The D.C. Circuit reversed Judge
Jackson's remedial order and his holdings of liability for attempted monopolization of the browser market and for tying Windows and Internet Explorer, but affirmed many of the holdings that Microsoft had illegally maintained its monopoly in the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems. 64 Microsoft later agreed with the Department of Justice and with most of the states to a consent decree, which was upheld by the District Court and the D.C. Circuit.
6 5
In follow-on litigation, 6 6 virtually all ofMicrosoft's significant rivals sued for damages from Microsoft's exclusionary practices, 67 and most of these cases have settled. 6 8 The picture for purchasers is more complicated. Significantly, 61 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999 ). Microsoft's monopoly of operating system software was protected by an "applications barrier to entry," the preference of software developers to write programs for the most popular platforms and the corresponding preference of computer users to use the platform for which the most applications are available.
The emergence of "middleware," like the browser and Java, to which applications could be written, threatened to undermine this barrier, and thus provoked Microsoft's competitive and anticompetitive responses. Consumers who purchased software directly from Microsoft successfully formed a class 7 3 and later settled.
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The class actions that are the subject of this study are part of a larger group of follow-on actions by consumers who bought Microsoft products from intermediaries. In at least one case, consumers alleged that they were actually direct purchasers, and therefore not barred by Illinois Brick, because the OEMs from whom they purchased had acted in concert with Microsoft, More important, even if all of Judge Jackson's findings were given collateral estoppel effect, they would be mainly of value to Microsoft's rivals that sued for damages from unlawful exclusion; they would be of limited relevance to claims by purchasers for overcharge damages. Judge Jackson held, and the court of appeals affirmed, that Microsoft had monopoly power in the market for Intel-compatible operating systems, as evidenced by its market share and the existence of the applications barrier to entry, 8 8 and that it had illegally maintained that power by its exclusionary actions against Netscape and Java. Microsoft, 355 F.3d at 327 (limiting offensive collateral estoppel to the facts that were "critical and necessary" in the limited sense of "essential" to the liability holdings upheld by the D.C. Circuit); Gordon, 2003 WL 22281574, at 9 (holding that indirect purchaser plaintiffs were only entitled to collateral estoppel on "central facts that were necessary and essential" to the finding of monopolization). 87 Gordon v. Microsoft Corp., No. MC 005994, 2003 WL 22281574, at 10-11 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Hennepin Co. Aug. 20, 2003 unprecedented popularity with consumers"). 92 Id., at 27 (findings of fact 9 65). 93 Id., at 19 (findings of fact 9 33). See also ibid, at 5, 15-16 (findings of fact 19 18, 54, 55). 94 Id., at 27 (findings of fact 9 65). It added that "[b]y pricing low relative to the short-run profitmaximizing price, thereby focusing on attracting new users to the Windows platform, Microsoft would also intensify the positive network effects that add to the impenetrability of the applications barrier to entry." Id. 95 Id., at 27 (findings of fact 9 66). 96 Id., at 44 (findings of fact T 136) ("Microsoft sought to increase the product's share of browser usage by giving it away for free. In many cases, Microsoft also gave other firms things of value (at substantial cost to Microsoft) in exchange for their commitment to distribute and promote Internet Explorer, sometimes explicitly at Navigator's expense."). See also ibid (findings of fact 9 137) ("Microsoft decided not to charge an increment in price when it included Internet Explorer in Windows for the first time, and it has continued this policy ever since. In addition, Microsoft has never charged for an Internet Explorer license when it is distributed separately from Windows."); ibid, at 71 (findings of fact 9 250 an opportunity to attract substantial revenue while enhancing (albeit temporarily) consumer demand for Windows 98, but the company also paid huge sums of money, and sacrificed many millions more in lost revenue every year, in order to induce firms to take actions that would help increase Internet Explorer's share of browser usage at Navigator's expense."). But cf. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 50 ("The fact that Microsoft ostensibly priced Internet Explorer at zero does not detract from the conclusion that consumers were forced to pay, one way or another, for the browser along with Windows.") Properly read, the Judge Jackson here is not saying there was any increment in price; his point is that tying is illegal regardless of whether there is such an increase. See ibid (arguing that the purpose of prohibiting tying "is not, as Microsoft suggests, bundled with Windows. The trial court did hold that Microsoft acted consistently with monopoly power in some of its pricing decisions.
98 For example, Microsoft raised the price of an outdated version of Windows upon introducing Windows 98; 99 it priced an upgrade of Windows 98 at $89 even though an internal study had found that $49 would have been profitable; 100 and it charged different prices to different OEMs.
10 1 But these findings only related to whether Microsoft had monopoly power, not to whether the actions themselves were unlawful, or constituted any sort of overcharge.
Thus, far from holding that Microsoft imposed an overcharge, United States v. Microsoft actually suggests that prices of the operating system and the browser were lower, at least in the short run, because of the illegal conduct alleged in the government's case. As the government's expert witness testified "Microsoft has used its power to protect its operating system's monopoly from a threat that might not have materialized by this time anyway. And, in doing that, it has given away a lot of things."
' 0 2 This conclusion does mean that consumers were necessarily better off because of Microsoft's actions during the browser wars. Judge Jackson suggested they may have suffered a loss in system performance in being forced to take Internet Explorer, 10 3 and may have been hurt by reduced innovation in platform software. But these harms, if they occurred, are not evidence of an overcharge.
The Microsoft indirect purchaser cases allege a conventional overcharge theory of damages. Recognizing the limited support that the government case lends to this theory, the classes have alleged that Microsoft's illegal conduct began in the 1980s, long before the browser wars that were focus of the government case. Thus, the classes contended that Microsoft did acquire its monopoly power in the OS market illegally. Some of the classes alleged that this illegality extended to the Microsoft Office suite and other products that were not at issue in the government litigation. As we will see, the courts certifying some of the Microsoft classes sometimes failed to recognize this disjuncture between the government case and the indirect purchaser class actions.
simply to punish firms on the basis of an increment in price attributable to the tied product"). In any event, the court of appeals reversed the holding on tying, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 
IV. THE REASONING OF THE MICROSOFT CERTIFICATION DECISIONS
In the Microsoft certification decisions, as in others, the most important question was whether class issues predominated over individual issues. Issues of the defendant's liability were common to the class; thus, whether the common issues predominated over individual issues depended upon whether the plaintiffs offered a reasonable basis for proving the fact and amount of damages on a classwide basis. In most of the Microsoft certification cases, plaintiffs relied on expert testimony of Dr Keith Leffler of the University of Washington to show how they planned to prove the effect of Microsoft proposed to estimate the relationship between Microsoft's prices to its customers and the prices paid by end users using "basic economic principles," standard statistical methods, and data that "should be readily available." 10 8
Relying on the tax incidence model, he stated that, because distribution of Microsoft's products is competitive, the intermediate purchasers would pass on 100% of the overcharge to end users. Because end users have no good substitutes for Microsoft's product, all would pay higher prices regardless of where they purchased the product. Estimating the effect of an upstream overcharge on end users would be a matter of using regression analysis to control for the various other costs of the computer systems in which Microsoft's operating system is installed. According to Dr Leffler, the overcharge for all consumers, regardless of where they purchased their computers, could be estimated with one model., 0 9 Microsoft challenged these assertions through its own experts, claiming that Dr Leffler's account did not take account of numerous demand, cost, and competitive factors in different locations and at different times that would affect the rate of passing on.1 0 Microsoft also argued that Dr Leffler's assumption that the distribution level was perfectly competitive ignored the role of brand names, product differentiation, and high fixed costs in computer manufacture.
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As we will see, courts have differed in their view of the sufficiency of Dr Leffler's proposed methods. I begin by examining the three decisions that denied certification, then turn to those that granted certification. In the latter category, I give special attention to the decisions in Gordon v. Microsoft, which certified a Microsoft class even though it was the only indirect purchaser class ever certified in the state.
A. Reasons for Denying Certification
Courts in only two states have refused to certify Microsoft classes. In both instances, the most important reason for denial was the application of an exacting standard for certification. The courts required proof of damage to each member of the class rather than an average harm to the class as a whole; expressed skepticism that tax incidence and regression analysis could provide a basis for estimating actual damages to each class member on a classwide basis; and therefore insisted that the proponents of certification implement their methodologies using real-world evidence. In A&M Supply, 112 the Michigan court of appeals reversed the certification of a class of indirect purchasers of Microsoft operating system software, holding that plaintiff had not "set forth a viable method for proving actual damages on a class-wide basis" as required by the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act (MARA). 13 The court recognized the distinction between skeptical and sanguine views of the practicalities of indirect purchaser class actions, 14 and, after reviewing Michigan trial court decisions denying certification, interpreted MARA to require the "rigorous analysis" of the "skeptical" view. 1' 5 The court took the lesson of the Michigan cases to be that certification would only be appropriate if there were a "minimum number of variables involved" and the plaintiff does "more than promise that [the necessary calculation of damages] will be available in the future."" 6 The proposed methods for proving the overcharge might have been sufficient under this standard, but the methods for proving passing on were not.
The court rejected Dr Leffler's proposed use of tax incidence theory to prove passing on, because he had not taken account of the complexities of the market identified by Microsoft's experts. 117 The court characterized as "slogans" his proposal to use "relatively simple statistical estimations" and "basic economic principles." 1 8 Although Dr Leffler had not had access to data yet, his "broad, nonspecific references fail to describe a method or formula by which a court could determine that Microsoft's conduct caused actual damages or injury to each class member," 1 1 9 and it was the plaintiff's choice to move for class certification at such an early stage. The proposed use of regression analysis to isolate the effect of the overcharge on retail prices was likewise insufficient, because it was a bare assertion. The A&S court did not characterize the Microsoft indirect purchaser class actions as involving complexities substantially greater than other indirect purchaser class actions. The court found that "some of the concerns" earlier Michigan courts had about proposed classes were present in the Microsoft class. It noted that the class was enormous and covered six products over several years. Moreover, Microsoft's expert's study had shown that computer distributors were not perfectly competitive, and charged different prices and relied on price points, and so would likely have had different rates of passing on at different times. 121 113 Id., at 603. 114 Id., at 579-81.
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Id., at 600. 116 Id., at 598-99. 117 Id., at 602. One expert found that consumers paid different prices for identical Compaq systems, and the same price for very different systems. Retailers apparently did not always raise prices in response to cost increases if they were at "price points" that are effective for marketing. Id., at 587. The other state to have denied certification was Maine in Melnick. 1 22 Of the only two earlier Maine indirect purchaser decisions cases, one had certified a class and the other had not.
1 23 The court in Melnick, however, applied a stringent approach typical of the skeptical view. The court required the plaintiffs to offer a method of proving damages to each class member by common proof, not only aggregate damage to the class,1 24 and refused to recognize a presumption of injury in the indirect purchaser context. 125 It rejected Dr Leffler's proposed methods for accomplishing this task, emphasizing that he relied only on general theoretical assertions, despite extensive discovery, while Microsoft's experts had offered specific studies of competitive conditions in the Maine computer market, and the various actors' actual pricing practices.
126 Although the court agreed that it should not resolve a battle of experts at the certification stage, it insisted that the expert offer some specific evidence that theoretical claims are borne out by real world facts.
B. Reasons for Granting Certification

The Sanguine View Generally
A number of states have granted certification in every case for which courts have issued a written opinion. In some of these states, the Microsoft cases are the only indirect purchaser cases in which certification has been proposed. In some instances, the courts offered no reasoning in support of their decisions, presumably adopting the extreme sanguine position that certification was so obviously warranted that it required no justification.
The cases that did offer reasoning to support certification did so on similar grounds. Some suggested that the adoption of an indirect purchaser statute created a presumption that class member. Id., slip op. at 13. The plaintiff's expert in this case, James Levinsohn, offered actual regressions using data from Michigan retailers, but the court rejected methodology on the ground that the did not adequately capture market realities, and would have proven only average harm to the class. For another recent Michigan case emphasizing the same point, see Ren v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 00-004035-CZ, 2002 WL 1839983, at 15 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne Co. Jun. 11, 2002 The sanguine courts, however, characterized these differences as a "battle of experts" that could only be resolved by an examination of the merits, which was precluded at the certification stage. 136 Many courts applied the peculiarly deferential standard that the expert need only offer a method that was not so "insubstantial as to amount to no method at all."' 13 7
Some noted also that if the evidence ultimately did not establish impact by , and failing to do so would deny all relief. Id., at 18. Dr Leffler's methodologies provided a reasonable estimate of damages, for certification purposes, of damages based on accepted economic principles, even if they could not calculate the harm to each class member. Id., at 9-10. Whether the methods were sufficient to support damages was an issue for trial, ibid, at 15, and the court should not attempt to resolve a battle of experts. Id., at 15-17. Indeed, the fact that Dr Leffier had data available after substantial discovery did not impose any requirement that he actually use his methodologies. Id., at 17. The court rejected Microsoft's argument that the market was too complex to allow common proof, citing federal courts' certification of direct purchaser cases and sanguine states' certification of Microsoft classes, ibid, at 14-15, but failing to cite Execu-Tech's refusal to certify a Florida indirect purchaser case on this ground. Co. Nov. 21, 2001 ). Peridot denied certification of a class of businesses alleging a price fixing conspiracy among tissue manufacturers, pointing out that, up to that time, no Minnesota court had certified a class of indirect purchasers. The court was especially concerned that the expert offered no means of controlling for nonconspiratorial factors in his damage model, and that some businesses purchased tissue from suppliers other than the defendants. Peridot, 2000 WL 673933, at 5. Godden rejected a proposed class of consumers who bought milk at retail stores, emphasign the complexity of the state's milk markets and distribution system, and the absence of consumer records of purchases. Godden, slip op. at 2-4. Ludke disagreed with Smith v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., No. 00-CV-26 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Seward Co. Nov. 15, 2001) , and refused to certify a class of retail purchasers of cigarettes, concluding that, given the frequency of purchases of cigarettes, and the absence of records of the purchases, it would be impossible to determine damages by common proof or to administer a claims process. 146 Gordon v. Microsoft Corp., No. 00-5994, 2001 WL 366432 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 30, 2001 More than 2 years later, after discovery had occurred, and on the eve of trial, Microsoft moved to decertify the class. A number of courts, in certifying Microsoft indirect purchaser classes, had mentioned the possibility of decertification after discovery, but Gordon was the only one actually to confront the issue. 157 Although the plaintiff, during discovery, had switched experts and theories of classwide injury, the court declined to decertify the class, saying that the battle of experts should now be resolved at a trial.
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Microsoft again challenged the proposed methods of proving an "embedded" overcharge with respect to early purchasers of Microsoft products; the court responded that, even if true, this criticism would only shorten the damage period. The court also rejected Microsoft's claim that, to prove passing on, it would be necessary for all of the intermediate purchasers to testify to how they responded to price changes. Even under Microsoft's view of the evidence, all of the distributors passed on some of the costs, and proof of the amount of damages is subject to a lesser standard of proof. '55 Id., at 8-9. 156 Id., at 11. 157 At least one court has decertified an indirect purchaser class action. In In re Methionine Antitrust Litig., 204 F.R.D. 161, 167 (N.D. Cal. 2001 ) the court initially denied certification on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to offer a plausible method of proving injury to all indirect purchasers on a classwide basis. The following year, however, the plaintiffs persuaded the court to grant certification by amending the complaint to limit the class to end users of methionine. In re Methionine Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 00-1311 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2002 . Applying the "better than no method" standard, the court approved Dr Leffler's proposed methods of proving passing on, even though methionine was an ingredient that was added in very small quantities to other products in the chain of distribution. The court noted that there were few defendants and a relatively small class of commercial plaintiffs. Most important, the court upheld, for initial certification, the proposed multiple regression analysis Dr Leffler offered to show the pass-on rate. Id., slip op. at 7-8. After discovery, however, the court decertified the class, finding that that Dr Leffler had failed to collect data, perform a multiple regression analyses, or examine any of the variables that might have affected the price of methionine. In re Methionine Antitrust Litig., No. 00-1311 WL 22048232, at 10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2003 (10) His simple regressions failed to account for the prices of feed, labor or transportation, and only used data from selected products and time periods. Id., at 12-14. 158 Gordon v. Microsoft Corp., NO. MC 00-5994, 2003 WL 23105550 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 15, 2003 . 159 Id., slip op. at 4-6.
C. The Dubious Role of United States v. Microsoft
The Microsoft indirect purchaser plaintiffs undoubtedly expected to benefit from the rulings in United States v. Microsoft The experience of the Minnesota Microsoft court is instructive. In initially granting certification, the court wrote that "Judge Jackson not only described an overcharge to direct purchasers but specified an amount," citing the finding 160 The court in A&M characterized the findings and conclusions in the government case as "the legs on which this case stands." A&M Supply Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 654 N.W2d 572, 592 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002 ). An exception is Melnick, which recognized that Judge Jackson's findings do not support a finding of an overcharge. Melnick v. Microsoft Corp., No. CV-99-709, CV-99-752, 2001 WL 1012261, at 1 1-12 (Me. Super. Ct. Cumberland Co. Aug. 24, 2001 See, e.g., A&M Supply, 654 N.W.2d at 587 (plaintiffs alleged that "Microsoft's behavior allowed it to raise its prices for its products above competitive pricing levels in Michigan, creating artificially high prices consumers cannot escape"). 164 See, e.g., In re Florida Microsoft Antitrust Ltig., No. 99-27340 CA 11, 2002 WL 31423620, at 1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Miami-Dade Co. Aug. 26, 2002 (stating that plaintiffs alleged that "Microsoft established a monopoly in the market for operating system software through various anticompetitive acts and has maintained this monopoly since the late 1980s"); A&M Supply, 654 N.W.2d at 586 (stating that plaintiffs alleged that "since the midl980s, Microsoft had used monopolistic and anticompetitive means to dominate production of operating systems and software for personal computers"). See also In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 1332 WL 118908 at 3 (D. Md. Jan. 12, 2001 ) (alleging exclusion of DR-DOS and OS/2); Caldera, Inc., v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D. Utah 1999 (denying Microsoft's motion for summary judgment in a claim that Microsoft had illegally excluded DR-
DOS).
165 See, e.g., Comes v. Microsoft Corp., No. CL8231 1, slip op. at 6 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Polk Co. Sept. 16, 2003) (holding that "[i] n this instance, the Plaintiffs' burden [on class certification] is slight because the facts are not speculative" in that "many of the facts have been established in a government action against Microsoft in which the Iowa Attorney General participated"). 166 Page, Limits, supra n 4, [33] [34] that Microsoft charged $89 for an upgrade of Windows when it could have charged $49.167 There are a number of problems with using this finding in this way. First, the finding did not characterize the difference between $89 and $49 as an overcharge attributable to illegal conduct; it was intended only to show that Microsoft had monopoly power. An overcharge, for antitrust purposes, is the difference between the actual price and the price that would have prevailed absent illegal conduct; it is not the difference between the actual price and the seller's cost.
1 68 Even if the indirect purchaser plaintiffs were able to prove that Microsoft acquired its monopoly illegally by its actions before 1994,169 it would not follow that a supracompetitive price reflected an illegal overcharge. It is not clear that, absent any illegal conduct, the market for operating systems would have produced a competitive price, much less a price of $49 for a comparable product. The theory of network effects, on which the government's theory of liability rested, implies that the market for operating systems would be likely to tip toward a single dominant producer even without efforts by Microsoft to influence the process. Consequently, it is likely that a dominant producer would have emerged in any but for world.
Second, the finding did not have binding effect as evidence of supracompetitive pricing. The Minnesota court itself later determined that the only essential findings on monopoly power were that that Microsoft could have charged a supracompetitive price for Windows because of its high market share, the applications barrier to entry, and the lack of available substitutes.
1
167 Gordon v. Microsoft Corp., No. 00-5994, 2001 WL 366432, at 9 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Hennepin Co. Mar. 30, 2001 . 168 Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 297 (2d Cir. 1979 169 See Gordon v. Microsoft Corp., No. MC 005994, 2003 WL 22281574, at 4 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Hennepin Co. Aug. 20, 2003 (recognizing that "the government alleged and proved only that Microsoft illegally maintained a monopoly [while] the plaintiffs contend that Microsoft acquired a monopoly in operating systems and applications software through anticompetitive conduct"). 170 Dr Leffier suggested as a possible measure of damages comparing the margin for Windows with the margins for "anti-virus software, fax software, and internet portal markets. " Bellinder v. Microsoft Corp., No. 00-C-0855, 00-C-00092, 99CV17089, 2001 WL 1397995, at 6 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Johnson Co. Sept. 7, 2001 ). None of these products are platform software, and thus would not be characterized by network effects. In the Minnesota case, when Microsoft moved to decertify the class, it became apparent that the plaintiffs' expert did not propose to offer any evidence of overcharges before 1994; nevertheless the court denied the motion on the theory that the plaintiffs might offer sufficient evidence of Microsoft's illegal conduct before 1994 to justify an inference of an "embedded" overcharge. See Gordon v. Microsoft Corp., No. MCOO-5994, slip op. at 3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Hennepin Co. Dec. 15, 2003) . It is not clear from the opinion how one might infer the magnitude of such an overcharge. 171 Gordon v. Microsoft Corp., No. MC 005994, 2003 WL 22281574, at 10 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Hennepin Co. Aug. 20, 2003 there is no economic basis to offset operating system overcharges because of predatory actions with respect to browsers. The predatory browser action may benefit consumers in the browser market in the short run until Microsoft establishes its monopoly in the browser market but this has no implications as to the injury and the amount of injury suffered by consumers in the separate operating system market. Moreover, the competitive browser price may have been zero, given that Netscape and Microsoft have given away their browsers for several years. If so, there is no consumer benefit to including IE with Windows. Finally, as emphasized in Judge Jackson's findings, the competitive harm from the browser tie-in by Microsoft included computer performance degradation and costs to consumers that were independent of the price charged for the browser. For whatever reason, this concern never presented an obstacle to certification of the Microsoft class actions.
V. CONCLUSION: THE CONSUMER INTEREST
The dust has largely settled in the Microsoft indirect purchaser litigation. It now seems that many of the certifications in these cases were based on the more lenient standard I have called the sanguine view of the problems of proving passing on of an overcharge. Certainly, some aspects of the case made it better suited to certification than some earlier cases. These included the existence of a single seller and a relatively small number of intermediate levels of distribution that were generally, though far from perfectly, competitive. The classes were enormous, but the purchases of Microsoft software by each class member were relatively few and probably documented better than most consumer transactions.xso On the other hand, some aspects of the case seemed to count against certification. The OS was incorporated into another product, and accounted for only a small part of the final price of the computer. Moreover, there were significant differences in prices to OEMs that might have affected any passed on overcharge, and the evidence apparently showed significant differences in the OEMs' policies relating to passing on. Nevertheless, only a very few of the decisions closely analyzed these differences. In general, the decisions were based on bare proposals to use statistical methodologies, not on application of those methodologies to the specific markets in the state. Microsoft's objections based on the specifics of the market were generally met with the response that class certification was not the time to resolve a battle of experts. Some of the courts may have overestimated the significance of United States v. Microsoft for the issue of whether an overcharge to class members could be shown by classwide proof.
It is difficult to evaluate whether the overwhelming use of the sanguine view in the Microsoft cases has been in the public interest. All but one of the cases have settled before trial stage, and the one that went to trial was settled without at Navigator's expense.
The court found that Compaq paid lower prices because it favored IE, ibid, at 68 (findings of fact 234), and Gateway paid higher prices because it favored Navigator, ibid (findings of fact 236). 179 Page, Limits, supra n 4, at 33. 180 But see In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 519, 523, n.2 (D. Md. 2002) (finding it economically unfeasible to distribute proceeds of settlement to consumers in part because "many individual consumers will not have retained proof of purchase documents").
reaching the jury. Consequently, we cannot tell if the sanguine courts' deferential approach to certification was warranted in these cases. In the abstract, a lenient standard makes erroneous grants of certification more likely, while a strict standard makes erroneous denials more likely. 18 1 Which is preferable depends on the ex ante estimate of the magnitude of the costs associated with the two types of error. Sanguine courts estimate that the costs of an erroneous denial are greater, first, because a denial ends the action, while a grant is only provisional, and, second, because an erroneous denial thwarts the substantive law's policy, while an erroneous grant only defers to a later time the proper termination of the action. Consequently, these courts suggest that the lenient certification standard is appropriate. Robert Bone and David Evans have objected to this reasoning. They point out, first, that virtually all cases settle soon after certification because of economic pressures on the defendant. 1 82 Where the risk of an erroneous finding of liability is significant, a defendant has strong incentives to settle even an unmeritorious lawsuit. Courts moreover only very rarely decertify a class action. ' 8 3 Thus, an erroneous grant is likely to be final, and to produce a costly settlement. 1 8 4 Bone and Evans also dispute the premise that an erroneous denial of certification necessarily thwarts social policies. In some instances, individual suits are possible in place of a class action; in cases in which they are not possible, the class action would not likely have produced compensation, so the primary consideration for social policy is deterrence, which may be achieved by other means, including public enforcement.' 8 5 They also argue that a lenient certification standard encourages more frivolous lawsuits to be filed. 1 86 On balance, they suggest that the social costs of the lenient rule outweigh the costs of a more stringent rule.' 8 7
With this analysis in mind, can we find anything in the experience in the Microsoft indirect purchaser class actions that would help us decide whether the more stringent skeptical rule of certification is preferable to the more lenient sanguine rule? Many of Bone and Evans' empirical observations are consistent with the Microsoft experience. All of the cases settled without an adjudication on the merits. Only one ever reached the stage of a motion for decertification, and that motion was denied, albeit on different grounds than 181 Bone & Evans, supra n 23, at 11287. " ' Id., at 1291-302. 183 Id., at 1302, n.188. 184 Id., at 1303. 's" Id., at 1305-11. 186 Id., at 1313. But see Hazard, supra n 23, at 65, n.92 (objecting that this assumption lacks an empirical basis). 18 Bone & Evans, supra n 23, at 1315. Bone and Evans argue courts should assess the likelihood of success at the certification stage. Hazard, supra n 23, rejects this proposal in favor of "weakform rules" allowing courts to conduct "reasonable inquiries into the merits as relevant to certification." Id., at 51. Hazard's description of weak form rules, ibid, at 59-61, is consistent with the skeptical approach.
the original grant. Moreover, like virtually all of the indirect purchaser class action settlements, the Microsoft settlements have provided little compensation to consumers.' 8 8 The vouchers were for small amounts, and only a relatively small percentage of consumers ever filed claims to receive the payments. For example, in the Minnesota case, 5 days before the deadline, 87 000 of an estimated 1 million possible claimants had filed claims for vouchers worth $15 for operating system software, $9 for Word, and $23 for Office and Excel. 18 9 The lion's share of the unclaimed amounts generally went to the state or to schools; in some of the settlements, a portion reverted to Microsoft. Thus, even if the three denials of certification in Microsoft indirect purchaser cases were erroneous, they probably did not thwart a social policy in favor of compensation. If, however, there was an overcharge, the actions might be justified on a deterrence theory. As Bone and Evans point out, the primary goal of class actions involving small individual stakes is deterrence. In fact, deterrence is preferable to compensation as an antitrust goal, because, if it is effective, it renders compensation unnecessary. The rationale of Illinois Brick was to concentrate the full right to recover in the direct purchasers, to assure that they had an adequate incentive to sue for the overcharge. But that rationale assumed that, if direct purchasers were given the full overcharge, the direct purchasers would actually sue, and the indirect purchasers would not. Since the rise of indirect purchaser suits in state court, of course, the issue has changed, because both direct and indirect purchasers can sue. This change has largely eliminated the concern about adequate deterrence, but created much greater concerns about overdeterrence. If multiple levels of purchasers could sue for the full overcharge, then defendants could be subject to duplicative recoveries.
190
Penalties should not be arbitrarily large; they should reasonably approximate an optimal penalty. It is difficult to say with any confidence, of course, what an optimal penalty is in a particular case.' 9 1 But if we take as a benchmark the federal measure of the treble damages for those who have suffered antitrust injury and have standing, it is doubtful that indirect purchaser class actions are typically necessary to achieve deterrence. Consequently, a more stringent standard for certification is likely to have minimal social costs. The complicating factor in the Microsoft litigation is that some of the direct purchasers have not sued, as one of the courts in the indirect purchaser cases noted. 192 Thus, one might argue that indirect purchaser suits are necessary to impose an adequate deterrent penalty. But this argument fails to recognize that Microsoft, unlike most overcharge cases, was about exclusionary practices, which imposed harm most directly on competitors rather than purchasers.
93
Predictably, all of the excluded rivals have sued and most have already received substantial settlements.
1 94 Consequently, it is doubtful that the indirect purchaser overcharge litigation was necessary to impose an adequate deterrent penalty.
